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Abstract 
Despite accounting for a significant share of global trade and the resulting interdependencies 
from it, energy governance remains largely fragmented and there is no global framework or 
agreement defining the rules of energy trade. This paper, after presenting the main global 
and regional energy market developments, discusses the opportunities to ‘energise the TTIP’, 
i.e. to include a chapter dedicated to trade and cooperation in the sphere of energy. The shale 
revolution in the US, the ever-rising interconnectedness of energy markets (recently proven 
by the disappearance of the ‘Asian gas premium’) and the EU’s quest to diversify its energy 
supplies generally sets favourable conditions to reinforce energy relations between the EU 
and the US. The question, as is often the case, is whether there is sufficient political will to 
tighten relations in a strategic sphere with connotations for national security and 
sovereignty.  
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Energising the TTIP: 
Political economy of the trade policy rationale 
Paolo Natali, Christian Egenhofer and Gergely Molnar* 
Paper No. 9 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’ 
and CEPS Special Report No. 113 / July 2015 
1. Introduction 
Despite accounting for a significant share of global trade1 and the resulting 
interdependencies from it, energy governance remains largely fragmented and there is no 
global framework or agreement defining the rules of energy trade. While the GATT/WTO 
Agreements do not specifically deal with energy trade and the Energy Charter Treaty (Box 1) 
failed to establish an effective agreement on cross-border trade, countries tend to frame 
energy trade into bilateral cooperation schemes – as energy is considered an area of high 
strategic relevance, having a strong impact on national security and sovereignty, which can 
also open the door to protectionism.  
 
                                                   
* Paolo Natali is an originator at Eni Trading & Shipping and a Visiting Professor at the Paris School of 
International Affairs (PSIA), Sciences Po. Christian Egenhofer is Associate Senior Fellow and Head of the Energy 
and Climate programme at CEPS and Director of the Energy Climate House. Gergely Molnar is a Research 
Assistant at CEPS Energy and Climate Change unit. The authors gratefully acknowledge useful comments 
received notably from Dan Hamilton of CTR and their CEPS colleagues, notably Jacques Pelkmans, Arno Behrens 
and Anna Dimitrova. Special thanks should go to Edward Chow of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, D.C., who reviewed a close to final draft and contributed invaluably to the improvement 
of the text. 
1 According to the World Bank the trade value in fuels is about 14.33% of global trade: 
(http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/WLD/Year/LTST/Summary). 
Box 1. Energy Charter Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty aims to promote international cooperation in the energy sector. Entering into force 
in April 1998, the Treaty’s provisions focus on four broad areas: 1) the protection of foreign investment, based 
on the extension of national treatment, or most-favoured nation treatment and protection against key non-
commercial risks; 2) non-discriminatory conditions for trade in energy materials, products and energy-related 
equipment based on WTO rules, and provisions to ensure reliable cross-border energy transit flows through 
pipelines, grids and other means of transportation; 3) the resolution of disputes between participating states, 
and – in the case of investment – between investors and host states; and 4) the promotion of energy efficiency.  
Members of the Energy Charter Conference, i.e. the ECT’s membership base, are from the European Economic 
Area, EU candidate and Neighbourhood countries, the Russian Federation and other countries from the 
former Soviet Union as well as Japan, Australia, Mongolia and Afghanistan. The Russian Parliament refused 
the ratification of the ECT, as the ECT’s Transit Protocol would require Russia to apply the principles of 
freedom of transit and non-discriminatory pricing to its oil and gas pipeline systems. In April 2004, the 
Russian Duma decided to remove the Transit Protocol from its agenda.   
The Treaty remains open for accession by all countries committed to the Charter’s principles. In an effort to 
enlarge its geographical scope, the International Energy Charter initiative has been launched in May 2015 in 
The Hague. 
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It is often suggested that the emergence of the US as a new energy superpower as a 
consequence of the shale revolution and the EU’s desire to reduce its energy import 
dependence on Russia in the wake of deteriorating EU-Russia relations, would not only 
increase the value of transatlantic energy trade but also deepen EU-US cooperation in this 
field, and possibly in foreign and security policy. Therefore, perhaps not surprisingly, the EU 
would like to include a distinct ‘energy and raw materials’ chapter into the TTIP (European 
Commission, 2013a; European Commission, 2015).   
On the other hand, to date, the US has pursued its ‘energy security’ or ‘oil independence’ 
approach since the mid-1970s. Oil and gas policy has been a result of the US fear of oil 
dependence, mainly on the Persian Gulf, and later of the fear of similar dependence on 
imported gas (see, for example, Yergin (2006)). Seen from this perspective, it is not obvious 
why energy should be included in TTIP. Energy is indeed rather special and faces rather 
uncommon trade and other barriers, some of which in the past seem to have served rather 
well the national interest of the US. Such US barriers include an export ban on US crude oil 
and a licencing regime for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trade for those countries with which 
the US does not have a free trade agreement. To date US negotiators seem unconvinced of 
the value of an energy chapter and argue that energy is already sufficiently covered in other 
chapters of the TTIP. Notably, they hold that once TTIP is concluded, natural gas exports 
from the US to the EU would be sufficiently facilitated, should there be a market in Europe. 
This is because under the Natural Gas Act, LNG exports to countries with which the US has 
free trade agreements that require “national treatment” for trade in natural gas are 
automatically considered in the public interest. Applications to export gas to such countries 
must be approved without modification or delay. However, LNG exports destined to non-
FTA countries, with which the US does not have a free trade agreement, are subject to a 
project-based licencing system. Hence, they need the approval not only of the FERC (for 
environmental issues) but also of the Department of Energy (to ensure that these exports do 
not harm ‘the public interest’) (Chadbourne, 2014; Energy.gov, n.d.). 
The primary motivation for the EU to include a chapter on energy into the TTIP seems to be 
to set a benchmark not only in terms of transparency, non-discrimination and competition 
rules but also of an open international market for trade of ‘environmental goods and services 
and climate-friendly products and technologies’. At first sight, one might think this is the 
predictable EU reflex on spreading its rules, often referred to as ‘Europeanisation’. This 
tactical move to make TTIP more palatable inside the EU given the concessions that it might 
need to make might play a role. But when reading the “Initial EU position paper” (European 
Commission, 2013a), it is easy to see that the target is not so much the TTIP in itself but other 
trade agreements that might appear as spin-offs. The EU would like to anchor energy in 
what might become a template or part of the template for future agreements.  
This chapter will analyse how the market dynamics unleashed by the US energy revolutions 
might shape the transatlantic energy agenda, in particular in TTIP, and what potential 
economic and political benefits it could yield. The concluding section will identify the future 
transatlantic energy agenda. 
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2. The TTIP energy market context  
2.1 The US shale revolution 
For many years there has been transatlantic trade of coal and oil products. This trade has 
been stable, i.e. diesel and petrol with a value amounting to around €298 billion between 
2004 and 2014.2 There was no export of crude oil from the US, to a large extent because of the 
1975 export ban, although the type of crude which could have been exported, i.e. light sweet, 
would not have been available in sufficient quantity to do so. With the shale revolution this 
has changed. In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, in December 1975 the US passed 
the Energy Policy and Energy Conservation Act, a ban on most US oil exports. A few 
exceptions exist such as crude from Alaska’s Cook Inlet and North Slope and heavy oil from 
certain California fields. Article 605 of NAFTA restricts the US ability to limit its crude oil 
and petrochemical exports to Canada (and vice versa). While Mexico is not part of Article 
605, there are also exceptions for re-exporting foreign oil and for small swaps with Mexico.   
Similarly, all US natural gas exports are subject to certain limitations. Those destined to non-
FTA countries, with which the US does not have a free trade agreement, are subject to a 
project-based licencing system and need the approval of both FERC (for environmental 
issues) and the Department of Energy (to ensure that these exports do not harm ‘the public 
interest’).  
This situation remained relatively stable as long as the US was facing increasing import 
dependency for both oil and natural gas. The US shale gas and shale oil revolution has 
fundamentally reversed this situation. Coupling hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling 
resulted in a tremendous increase in shale gas production in the US. The same techniques 
have also generated a comparable revolution in oil. As a result, the US became the world’s 
largest natural gas producer in 2012 and the largest oil producer in 2013. As shown in Figure 
1, both crude oil and natural gas imports into the US declined over the last decade, and this 
trend is more than likely to continue in the future.  
This technological breakthrough in the North American upstream energy, i.e. production, 
sector over the last decade has affected almost all segments of the energy markets, not only 
in North America but globally. The sudden abundance of natural gas within North America 
transformed the continent from a net importer to a one in need of finding export markets. 
Export markets are seen as potentially constituting a safety valve, in order to release 
domestic production internationally, thus reducing oversupply and the subsequent severely 
depressed domestic price. Natural gas is literally ‘trapped inside’ the region until export 
licences are granted and LNG export terminals are built. 
                                                   
2 Eurostat, International trade, EU trade since 1988 by SITC [DS-018995]. 
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Figure 1. US oil and gas imports (2004-14) 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from US Energy Information Agency. 
With production increasing from 0.6 mb/d in 2008 to 4.7 mb/d in 2014, the situation for 
shale oil is shaping up in a similar fashion, despite it being more complicated owing to crude 
quality issues. Crude oil is legally ‘trapped’ until the long-lasting export ban is lifted. 
Legislation hindering the free flow of oil, the world’s most easily transportable energy 
source, widens the gap between the US oil prices and other international oil price 
benchmarks. For instance, in 2014 the spread between Brent and WTI (West Texas 
Intermediate) reached $12/barrel (Reuters, 2015). Hence, the US refining sector is 
experiencing high margins and utilisation rates thanks to the cheaper feedstock and whilst 
European refining is losing ground in a more and more severe way. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), since 2008 crude processing capacity in the EU has 
contracted by around 8% with 15 refineries closing and three reducing their output (IEA, 
2014). While the recent fall in crude oil prices improved the competitiveness of the European 
refinery sector, the longer-term outlook remains less optimistic, not least because of 
tightening regulations in the EU and the rising competitiveness of the US refinery complex 
ICIS (2015). Moreover, one should note that the US is facing an oversupply of light sweet 
crude oil (particularly desirable as a feedstock for gasoline refining) as US refineries are more 
suitable to heavy crude oil (EIA, 2015c).  
In addition, coal consumption for electricity generation in the US has fallen significantly as 
natural gas has become more cost competitive. US coal can freely move out of North 
America to flood other regions and in particular Europe (see Figure 2). This trend is 
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reinforced by the fact that US coal prices dropped to their lowest level in six years in the first 
quarter of 2015.3  
Figure 2. EU-28 solid fuel imports from the US (thousand tonnes) 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from Eurostat. 
In order to understand the energy politics of TTIP, one must understand the changes in 
market dynamics in the US. The result of the interplay of technological breakthroughs, 
regulation and market dynamics has had enormous implications within the US and 
worldwide (Morse, 2014). For the US and its North American neighbours the shale gas 
revolution has indisputably been the main energy event of the last decade. Since 2008, it has 
changed the original shape of natural gas flows within the domestic pipeline system. The 
system was originally intended to bring gas from the production/import centres of the Gulf 
of Mexico and Canada into the main consumption areas, especially the north-east. The 
emergence of the main shale geographic areas – referred to as ‘plays’ – has somewhat 
reversed this picture: while Eagle Ford, in Texas, is relatively close to Henry Hub and thus 
still pushes gas in the same original directions, the Marcellus shale play stretches from 
Maryland to upstate New York, thus sitting right in the backyard of the big cities of the 
north-east, which are the main consumption centres. Such is the abundance of gas that 
reverse flows from Marcellus to the south-east are becoming a reality.  
The physical change in flows has brought about a corresponding change in local pricing, and 
hereof positioning by all players in order to secure transportation capacities in different and 
previously ancillary pipelines, reverse flows and the like (Hamilton & Santa Maria, 2014). 
The traditional domestic price differentials, measured in terms of a positive “basis” from the 
reference Henry Hub, have reduced dramatically4 and no longer justify transport from 
Texas, hence effectively becoming negative (EIA, 2013b). 
                                                   
3 Central Appalachian coal prices, the benchmark dropped to $52.75/short tonne; see EIA (2015b). 
4 Spot prices, in $/MMBtu, on 27 August 2014: Henry Hub 3.99, New York 2.79. NGI Daily Gas Price Index. 
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The abundance of gas traded at Henry Hub itself has brought down the price by around four 
times, i.e. from $11.27/MMBtu5 in May 2008 to $2.85/MMBtu in May 2015. Many early 
entrants in domestic shale gas production have been struggling with financing their projects 
due to this depressed price situation. LNG imports have become virtually non-existent6 and 
the low prices are here to stay until LNG export terminals come on stream to work as a 
safety valve to the system. The first LNG exports from the contiguous US are scheduled for 
the end of 2015. However, exports might impact domestic gas prices only when they reach a 
more significant level, but this is not going to happen at least for two or three years.7 
Moreover, in recent years the global LNG market has experienced two phases: with 
European8 NBP (National Balancing Point) prices typically hovering around the $8-
10/MMBtu mark, and US (Henry Hub)9 prices plunging below $5/MMBtu after the first 
batches of shale gas production came to market, there has been a period, roughly 
corresponding with 2013, during which Asian prices above $15/MMBtu would certainly 
justify US exports to Asia. Note that during that period and up to now, not a single load of 
LNG landed from the contiguous US in Asia, because the pre-shale gas revolution market 
did not need export capacity, and building new LNG export terminals takes time.   
Several changes in market fundamentals in 2014 have brought Asian prices down and in the 
first months of 2015 even below those of Europe’s average import price) (see Figure 3). The 
main reasons behind this are slowing Chinese economic growth and its increasing interest in 
piped gas, weather conditions in the Pacific-Asian region (cold summer followed by a mild 
winter), nuclear restarts in South Korea, Japan’s drive for energy efficiency to diminish the 
Fukushima effect, the appearance of new supply sources (start of the PNG LNG10 export 
plant in May 2014) and finally the new low-price oil era.  
                                                   
5 Millions of British thermal units. 
6 LNG imports into the US are expected to be 0.17 Bcf/d in both 2014 and 2015, a very tiny volume when 
compared to a domestic consumption expected to average 72.6 Bcf/d during 2014. See EIA (2014), section on 
“Natural Gas”. 
7 “Many of the latecomers frantically snatched up shale leases during the buying spree of 2009-12. But lots of 
these parcels of land have proved disappointing and now look to have been overpriced. The influx of the 
supermajors has contributed to another problem, too: a gas glut, exacerbated by inadequate pipeline 
infrastructure, that has kept US benchmark Henry Hub spot prices largely below $4 per MMBtu since 2011. 
Companies are being forced to redirect their efforts to areas rich in more profitable crude oil and natural gas 
liquids (NGLs).” See Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
8 UK National Balancing Point, i.e. UK import price. 
9 US hub price. 
10 Papua New Guinea LNG plant, with a 6.9 MTPA capacity. The plant started its first LNG shipments in May 
2014.  
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Figure 3. Regional gas price dynamics: The disappearing ‘Asian premium’ 
 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI), World Bank and EIA. 
All in all, this means that we are entering uncharted territory in a second phase in which, 
theoretically at least, a hypothetical US LNG tanker could be better off in Europe than in 
Asia, especially if liquefied in the Gulf of Mexico or the East Coast, thanks to the lower cost 
of logistics.  
Whatever the views on future fundamentals and therefore on possible LNG flows, it is safe 
to say that they will swing between one and the other of these two phases. At current 
technology and logistics levels, US exports to Europe are commercially viable roughly when 
the NBP-Henry Hub spread is higher than $5/MMBtu. A spread of $7-8/MMBtu would be 
required to justify exports from the Gulf of Mexico or East Coast to Asia. It is straightforward 
to observe that if US export terminals had been in operation, in the first phase Asia would 
have competed with Europe as a destination for LNG, while in the second (current) phase, 
export volumes would have reached European shores. Hence, flows will be directed by 
commercial logic, regardless of the TTIP or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, 
these agreements send a strong signal to the main market players and project investors that 
there is political will to ease LNG flows, if they are commercially viable.  
Hence, Europe could secure transatlantic trade. However, in the US this would require US 
LNG export terminals to be in put place along with legislation providing clarity about the 
expected or maximum export capacity. For that matter, to allow the EU to fully benefit from 
the global LNG market, the interconnectivity of Europe’s internal gas market would need to 
be improved and regasification capacity in north-east and south-east Europe increased (see 
Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Existing, constructed and planned LNG import plants in Europe 
 
Note: bcma = billion cubic metres/annum. 
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on data from Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE). 
 
If this happens, the TTIP commitment to market-opening as well as discipline on restrictions 
such as the lifting of licencing regimes or export bans (in the case of oil) will facilitate the 
flows of goods and services. This will be further facilitated if common rules can be agreed 
upon. Whether LNG flows towards the EU will become commercially viable is a different 
matter, and much will depend on whether European gas prices will be able to compete with 
those proposed by Asian buyers.   
Canary Islands: 
Operational: 
23 terminals, 203.46 bcma 
 
 
 
Large-scale terminals in the EU: 
 
 
Under construction/extension: 
8 terminals, 52.6 bcma 
 
 
 
Planned new/extension 
34 terminals, 188.9 bcma 
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All in all, the picture looks favourable on a systemic level, but with a number of specific 
unsolved issues related to market dynamics and, most notably, the consolidation of the shale 
industry over time. The main player, the US government, needs to decide whether to grant 
export licences and, if so, how many, and whether to let the market decide or to try to control 
the flows and therefore domestic prices and production levels. This choice will be more 
political than economic, not because there will not be an economic gain or loss from it, but 
because such gain or loss will be due to the interplay of too many actors on a systemic level 
to be foreseen today. In broad terms, opinions in the US are divided between the supporters 
of the protectionist view, that is, modulating the newly found reserves so that they, in a 
protectionist manner, power the domestic economy for the longest possible time; and those 
who instead argue that maximising US exports would act as a multiplier through the overall 
economy, hence generating more wealth over time than simply earmarking indigenous 
reserves for domestic use. It is easy to see how the two camps advocate opposite trade 
measures: the former supports protectionism, the latter free trade. But the choice cannot 
ignore the systemic dynamics, including those at the global level.  
2.2 The EU’s quest for energy diversification 
Europe is in a different position than the US. The energy mix is not radically different from 
that of its transatlantic counterpart, but the forces at play suggest a likely divergence in the 
foreseeable future. Europe is import dependent and will remain so in the future, even if there 
is a question of how great this import dependence will be. Rapidly depleting domestic gas 
reserves and sustained gas demand (highly dependent on the effectiveness of measures 
taken to phase out coal) suggest that the EU’s gas import dependence will further increase in 
the future, although there is controversy on how much.11   
Prior to the shale revolution, the shape of Europe’s import patterns for natural gas would 
have looked different to those of North America, which would have increased its reliance 
primarily on LNG. But the geological and political situation is now such that even if 
indigenous European shale gas might end up being produced, it is unlikely to trigger a 
proper revolution of the energy sector as was the case in North America.12 And if anything, 
the relationship with its main supplier, Russia, is evolving in a way that suggests 
diversification out of gas might be in order (Egenhofer, Genoese & Dimitrova, 2014). 
Currently, the EU produces about 34% of its internal natural gas demand, and it imports the 
balance from a handful of countries: Russia, Norway, Algeria and (LNG from) Qatar. Most 
natural gas supply is entrenched in long-term contracts, often indexed to oil. The majority of 
these contracts will be due for renegotiation or renewal within the next 10-15 years, and 
increased liquidity at the hubs suggests that more and more gas is being traded on a short-
term basis.13  
                                                   
11 For instance, according to BP (2014) the EU will need to import 49% more natural gas by 2035. Similarly, 
European Commission (2013b) considers that the EU will import by 32 more Mtoe of natural gas by 2030 than it 
did in 2005. Honoré (2014) also suggests an increase of EU gas imports during this period. 
12 For a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for arguing a different trajectory in European shale gas compared 
to North America, see Sandrea (2014). 
13 For a comprehensive analysis, see Stern (2014). 
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2.3 Cheap coal  
Another aspect of the transatlantic relationship when it comes to energy is the effect of cheap 
US natural gas on global coal flows. As a consequence of low natural gas prices, the US is 
experiencing a significant switch from coal to gas in power generation, and a very limited 
switch from fuel oil to gas in home heating. The diminishing need for coal, heightened by the 
planned phase-out of older coal plants through performance regulation, has generated an 
export trend of cheap coal to Asia and Europe. 
The share of coal used for electricity generation has been shrinking in the US for the last few 
years – even if it still accounts for 39% of the country’s power mix in 2014. The European 
Union, however, experienced a sort of ‘coal renaissance’ between 2010 and 2012 as the share 
of coal increased in the EU’s power mix from 24% to almost 28%, although in 2013 the share 
of coal started to decrease in Europe (Eurostat data).  
Indeed, due to structural design problems and their exacerbation by the world financial crisis 
and the so-called ‘euro crisis’, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) as the EU’s main climate 
policy instrument has not been able to drive the phase-out of coal in Europe. The severity of 
the recession has led to a fall in economic activity and therefore to large emissions 
reductions. In addition, world coal prices have fallen so that the relative competitiveness of 
coal has increased. Without introducing a supply mechanism in the EU ETS, such as the 
proposed Market Stability Reserve, it might take until the mid-2020s at the earliest before a 
high enough carbon price would re-emerge to make gas more competitive. Many doubt, 
however, whether the ETS will be a suitable tool for supporting investment signals for low-
carbon generation capacity. On top of this, the present coal oversupply in the US makes this 
fuel even cheaper than it used to be, providing a competitive substitute to gas in power 
generation.  
However, there is a range of other policy measures on both sides influencing the electricity 
mix, in particular pollutants emissions control policies such as the EU ETS and the EU 
Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) and the U.S. Clean Power Plan. Inside the EU, other 
such measures have been initiated by EU member states, such as the withdrawal of the 
German nuclear programme after the Fukushima accident in March 2011, and the 
renewables support measures to phase out coal-fired plants in the UK, the Netherlands and 
possibly in Germany.14 These EU, US and national regulatory developments influence the 
power mix and are supplemented by exogenous changes, which markets have experienced 
as a result of other factors: among these are Asian economic growth, the 2008-09 financial 
crisis and subsequent economic downturn (which took place at different paces in different 
parts of the world economy), and resource developments across the globe. All of these 
elements influence the natural gas market to a great extent. 
Nevertheless, the reality in Europe is that coal is still a strategic resource in a number of EU 
member states for an array of reasons: it was the only source of power for the Polish 
                                                   
14 The UK introduced a carbon price to bolster the existing (too low) EU carbon price and is developing the 
legislative framework for the implementation of the Emissions Performance Standard for new fossil fuel plants as 
an annual limit on carbon emissions from new fossil fuel plants equivalent to 450g/kWh. The Netherlands under 
its national Energy Agreement of 2013, a settlement negotiated by the stakeholders, will phase out the technically 
least efficient capacity, which typically is coal. The German government is also considering additional regulation 
to deal with least efficient generation. 
ENERGISING THE TTIP | 11 
 
economy until very recently; it is needed to complete the German power mix after the 
government’s decision to phase out its nuclear power generation; it is defended by trade 
unions in Spain on employment grounds. Hence, a phase-out will be uneven across member 
states at best.  
3. The opportunities the TTIP could unlock in the long run 
Like the other sectors included in TTIP, the potential for improvement in energy trade lies in 
the area of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which would lead to immediate mutual benefits. The 
removal of barriers to LNG exports from the US would benefit the sector, with LNG exports 
opening an alternative source of supply to develop over time in order to find an alternative 
to the cheaper, potentially less secure, Russian gas.  
The impact of the removal of barriers can be increased further by common rules. For 
example, harmonising regulation related to the limitation of carbon emissions – even if not a 
realistic proposition at the moment and possibly for the foreseeable future – would create a 
level playing field that could at least partially create some clarity in a complicated field, 
which is currently being tackled in very different ways such as cap-and-trade, emissions 
standards or subsidies. Transatlantic coordination could prove useful in the long run in this 
respect, especially now that an alignment seems possible on the need for binding carbon 
reduction commitments, which the US had resisted for a long time. One could imagine the 
gradual linking of transatlantic cap-and-trade systems (Egenhofer, 2005) building on the 
experiences of existing systems such as the ETS or the one in California (and which is now 
gradually linked with the systems of the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario). This 
would not only send a signal that the transatlantic region is ready to factor a high CO2 price 
into its value chains but could also address sensitive issues such as ‘carbon leakage’ (Gros & 
Egenhofer, 2011) towards Asia. A high price of carbon in Europe would mean fewer outlets 
for its outflow of unused coal while a high carbon price in the US would mean a higher price 
of energy, which is actually going counter to the centrepiece of the shale revolution. Whether 
this happens will depend on many factors, not least the politics in the two regions, and 
currently there seems to be little immediate prospect. But the issue will not only not go away 
but become more important.  
3.1 US authorisation of LNG export terminals 
Although market projections suggest that American LNG will flow towards Europe and 
Asia, the current geopolitical situation suggests that non-economic factors might arise, if not 
dominate and justify some form of eastbound flow towards European LNG regasification 
terminals. In absence of a TTIP section providing energy cooperation and disciplines, the 
issue is left with the US regulator having to decide how many export terminals, and 
therefore how much export capacity, will be available. Moreover, leaving aside LNG could 
be interpreted by certain market players and project investors as a sign of lacking political 
will to ease LNG flows.  
3.2 Regulatory harmonisation over the longer term 
A further range of NTBs is caused by environmental regulations on both shores, especially 
where regulatory divergence results in certain plant or fuels being allowed in one region and 
not in the other. In this respect the most relevant area is pollutants emissions, and their 
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indirect impact on fuels through regulation that implies the phase-out of some types of 
electricity generation plants. In 2011 the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
introduced emissions standards for toxic air pollutants such as mercury, acid gases and 
sulphur dioxide.  
In September 2013 the EPA reintroduced CO2 performance standards for new power stations 
and in June 2014 it issued a proposal on the performance standards for existing power 
plants. In the proposed framework, the EPA would issue guidelines about the appropriate 
standards, but US states would be responsible for establishing and eventually implementing 
the performance standards once they have been approved by the EPA. Each state will have 
individual goals set by the EPA (a state-specific future carbon intensity of covered existing 
fossil‐fuel‐fired power plants in that state) and they will be free to choose the means to 
achieve the interim and then the final goal. All in all, the EPA expects that the Clean Power 
Plan would reduce nationwide CO2 emissions from the power sector by around 30% from 
2005 levels by 2030 (EPA, 2014). 
In the EU, the Industrial Emissions Directive sets out a pathway for the reduction of 
pollutants emissions, but the carbon emissions are only regulated through the 2007-09 
Climate Package, which sets a 20% overall emissions reduction target. Industrial and power 
sector emissions are regulated by the EU ETS (Ellerman, Convery & de Perthuis, 2010). On 
23-24 October 2014 the European Council decided on a new set of targets for 2030 (“2030 
Framework for climate and energy policy”), including a 40% greenhouse gas reduction, a 
minimum 27% renewables and a minimum 27% efficiency target. The EU ETS is also set to be 
strengthened, as the linear reduction factor of the EU-wide carbon cap will increase from the 
current 1.74% per year to 2.2% from 2021. In addition, the European Commission is trying to 
address the oversupply of carbon allowances, which has led to a fall of the allowances to less 
than €10/tonne of CO2. One strategy is changing the allocation time path. The other is 
establishing a supply side mechanism, e.g. the so-called ‘Market Stability Reserve’ (MSR) to 
adjust the auctioning volume by ‘parking’ allowances intended to be auctioned in a reserve 
and releasing them from the reserve to the market to maintain the total amount of 
allowances in circulation in a given year within a prescribed band. 
Should the US Clean Power Plan go ahead and the EU ETS not quickly manage to effectively 
address the current glut in emission allowances, an imbalance could be created whereby coal 
power plants would be forced to shut down faster in the US than in the EU, hence 
reinforcing the existing ‘coal leakage’. Whether this will be the case or will also depend on 
member states’ policies, such as those in the UK or the Netherlands, which are considering 
national measures emissions performance standards similar to those of the US, could 
potentially polarise the coal leakage problem towards some European countries and not 
others.  
Hence, regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US in the elaboration of emissions 
performance standards could effectively address the issue of coal leakage. On the other 
hand, the US could ask the EU to put its house in order. If not, the lack of a cap-and-trade 
carbon emissions system in the US, combined with the lower natural gas prices, will favour a 
sizeable medium-term switch from coal to gas in power generation, which will not be 
matched in Europe. Currently, there is no short-term scenario where the ratio between gas 
and coal prices would change so that gas increases market share in the EU power sector. 
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4. Bringing it all together  
Several changes in the structure of trade across the Atlantic might either benefit or harm 
various aspects of energy policy on both shores, typically enshrined in the triangular model 
for energy policy that combines the objectives of security of supply, competitiveness and 
sustainability. 
4.1 Security of supply 
North American LNG could serve European interests in starting, or at the very least 
introducing, diversification away from Russian imports of piped natural gas, not least 
because of supply security reasons. Whether this is an economically viable proposition 
depends on both the kind of security premium Europe is willing to pay and relative prices. 
As pointed out earlier, the 2013 scenario of prices of $18/MMBtu in Asia and $10/MMBtu in 
Europe would not justify Europe-bound flows (unless locked in long-term agreements); but 
the current scenario, where these prices are roughly equal and the spread with Henry Hub is 
around $5/MMBtu would create a strong case for it.15 The fundamentals of this market 
strongly suggest that prices in the next decade will reflect one of these two scenarios, 
perhaps switching several times between the two. European policy-makers might want to 
stop looking only to the east and to the south and perhaps turn their eye to the west as well. 
The politics and transatlantic commitments between authorities will need to be right in order 
to convince the market to create binding transatlantic ties. LNG imports from the US have 
the potential of being much more than the odd spot cargo. In the longer run, exports may 
well reduce the Asia/Europe price disparity. 
The other side of the coin is that for North America, shale gas can have the same security 
value as it would have for Europe – in fact, as has been seen, there is advocacy in favour of 
protectionism. Moreover, and in this case joined with oil, energy independence for the US 
means having more options in foreign policy, as dependence eases. This is also true for 
Europe. Commercial links grow fastest once they are embedded in an agreement such as 
TTIP. However, one should note that the extent to which such an agreement would facilitate 
natural gas trade will depend on two aspects. First, it will depend on the exact wording of 
the agreement, i.e. whether it would be fully inclusive or whether exclusions exist. The 
second aspect is how the LNG export licensing system will evolve in the US, i.e. the regime 
of planning permission for the export terminals (issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission). This is not a TTIP issue, however. The value of the aforementioned optionality 
is increasing the more the geopolitical situation gets complicated around the regions, which 
have traditionally exported to the EU.  
4.2 Competitiveness 
America is enjoying low natural gas and electricity prices that are at least in part enabled by 
the absence of LNG export capacity, while Europe struggles with higher gas prices and 
                                                   
15 It should be noted that the reason is not absolute cost, but arbitrage. The estimated cost of liquefaction and 
transport for US LNG to Europe is around $4/MMBtu, to Asia $5/MMBtu. Spot price differentials of more than 
$4/MMBtu between Henry Hub and NBP are not infrequent, and in a two-country, NTB-free model that would 
suffice to justify Europe-bound flows. But as long as the Asian price remains much higher, markets will choose it 
as preferred destination. See Medlock III (2012). 
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uncertainties from some of its traditional external suppliers. The argument for enabling 
transatlantic trade in natural gas is therefore in some respect similar to the arguments related 
to crude oil. But this also means that, inside the US, there are vested interests in industry and 
the energy sector pushing against it. While Russian gas is cheaper than LNG in monetary 
terms, member states seem to place different values on enhanced diversification and having 
more supply options. Ultimately, the political choice for Europe is what price it is willing to 
pay for diversification and to increase optionality (such in the case of Poland and Lithuania, 
which opted for regasification facilities, or the EU’s push to establish a Southern Gas 
Corridor). This political choice may well cause controversy: some member states are keener 
to diversify energy sources away from Russia than others.  
4.3 Sustainability 
When it comes to environmental policy, transatlantic cooperation is virtually non-existent 
despite the huge impact it could have on global climate change policy. Cooperation could 
range from a common ETS to the regulation of product standards and elaboration of support 
schemes for renewables subsidies. Each partner has its own environmental policies; carbon 
emissions reduction, the phasing out of polluting plants, steering the electricity mix, cleaning 
the transport sector, promoting greener ‘infant industries’. Of all these policies, the ones that 
the TTIP might potentially address would possibly be a common emissions performance 
standard, carbon tax or trading system.  
5. Towards a future agenda: Include other energy commodities 
While the debate seems mature for the inclusion of natural gas as part of transatlantic trade 
talks, other energy commodities and policies would equally benefit from becoming part of 
the transatlantic trade agenda. 
5.1 Oil independence in a single country 
Oil is the foremost of these. As has been mentioned before, in the US, the shale oil revolution 
is expected to follow a very similar pattern as that of gas a few years before, with the main 
reserves located between Canada, North Dakota and Texas. Gas is dependent on the 
availability of pipelines for its transport, like water flows from the aqueduct under the streets 
of a town and finally into the pipes of a household, and this structure defines the volumes 
that can be shipped and the route options that can be chosen. Oil incurs fewer such issues, as 
it is ultimately more easily transportable than gas. Yet the debate over the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline is a relevant example of how the old pipeline system is called to task: 
by making more oil transportable via pipeline, many argue Keystone XL would reduce the 
need for oil to find alternative and less secure means of transportation, and more specifically 
limit the scope for railway congestion and accidents involving cargo trains bringing crude 
and products to market from North Dakota and Canada.  
Availability of indigenous shale oil in North America means that the US, which used to be a 
net importer, is now becoming less and less dependent on external suppliers. However, the 
export ban on crude oil means all domestically produced crude has to be processed in the US 
refining system. From a transatlantic perspective, there would be scope for lifting such a ban 
and opening an eastbound trade route towards Europe. The crude export ban creates a 
domestic glut, with downward pressure on pricing, which on the one hand represents a 
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disincentive for producers, and on the other hand marks domestic crude for exclusive use as 
feedstock for domestic refineries, boosting the latter’s profitability, thus making American oil 
products, e.g. in the petrochemical industry, more competitive abroad and reinforcing the 
US’s position as the world largest petroleum product exporter. 
For this reason, the US refining industry is resisting this potential change: not only has it 
reinforced its traditional export route for diesel, but it has also contributed to the inversion of 
a traditional gasoline import trend from Europe into the US. Losing the competitive 
advantage in producing gasoline, which somewhat balanced the US supremacy in diesel, 
Europe remains a net importer of all energy commodities, and is left with a struggling 
refining industry. Swamped with refined products and having lost its supremacy on the 
gasoline side, many European majors are now facing increasing pressure to downsize their 
refining and retail business as a result. 
With some small exceptions, the bulk of crude will still have to be processed in the US, 
whose policy-makers worry that the newly found advantage of increasing self-sufficiency 
could be threatened if the ban were lifted.16 But holding that lifting the ban would 
automatically realign refining margins across the Atlantic is not correct: transportation costs 
and current contractual structures would still be such that the region where crude is 
produced would retain a competitive advantage over the relatively resource-scarce region, in 
this case Europe. But modest trade flows, and therefore realignment in margins, might occur. 
How this will occur is a crude quality issue and uncertainty on crude exports is freezing US 
refining investment. There will be winners and losers inside the US refining system, given 
the distorted light/heavy crude differential and depending on whether one is running a 
complex or simple refinery, which differs by region in the US. This is why the US debate on 
the ban is difficult. 
5.2 Biofuels 
Global trade in biofuels has expanded in recent years, the two main commodities traded 
being ethanol and biodiesel. The US has been the world’s largest producer of ethanol since 
the early 2000s but, being also the largest consumer, it has only become a net exporter in 
2011. In 2014 US ethanol exports amounted to around 20 million barrels (EIA, 2015d). Brazil, 
Jamaica and El Salvador are its main import sources. The US was a net exporter of biodiesel 
between 2007 and 2012, only to become a net importer in 2013, with imports amounting to 
8.152 and 5.059 millions of barrels in 2013 and 2014 respectively (EIA, 2015a).  
These trends for both fuels are mainly steered by government policy, in particular subsidies 
on domestic ethanol production (in the form of tax credits) as well as the price support for 
sugar production. On the other hand, to some extent the ethanol demand faces a technical 
ceiling in the amount of ethanol that can be blended with gasoline. The current US biofuel 
policy is based on the Renewable Fuels Standards. Enacted by the Energy Policy Act in 2005 
and expanded by the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), the Renewable Fuels 
Standards requires adding continually increasing volumes of renewable sources into the 
country’s fuel supply – growing from nearly 13 billion gallons in 2011 to 36 billion gallons by 
2022 (EIA, 2013a). In addition, the EISA authorised $500 million annually for the 2008-15 
                                                   
16 This reluctance on the US side is also the gist of the most recent debate on inserting an energy chapter in the 
TTIP. See EUobserver (2014). 
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ﬁscal years for the production of advanced biofuels with at least an 80% reduction in life-
cycle greenhouse gas emissions relative to current fuels. The use of biofuels is also 
encouraged through tax benefits. For instance, on 1 January 2012 the US eliminated the $0.54-
per-gallon import tariff it used to impose on ethanol imports. The $0.45-per-gallon tax credit 
to blenders has also been removed. 
In the EU, on the other hand, demand for biofuels is growing strongly, due to organic 
demand growth, as well as to the fact that the 2007-09 Climate and Energy Package includes 
a 10% renewable target for the transport sector by 2020, and the Fuel Quality Directive 
implies a 6% reduction in GHG emissions in the sector. The former obviously implies the 
introduction of liquid biofuels, while the latter is an additional incentive in that direction. 
According to the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) submitted to the 
European Commission, member states intend to collectively exceed the 10% target. The 
NREAPs also indicated that the 10% target would be met by 8.5% conventional biofuels, 1% 
second generation biofuels and 1% renewable electricity, most of which would be used in 
rail. The contribution of hydrogen is expected to be negligible (ePURE, 2014). There is no 
biofuel target agreed within the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies (European 
Commission, 2014a).  
Europe does not produce enough biofuels to satisfy demand and therefore large volumes are 
imported, especially biodiesel. The source of these imports depends mainly on technical 
requirements for compliance with the fuel quality Directive (see below). Indeed, to qualify 
for both the renewables energy and fuel quality Directives, biofuels consumed in the 
European Union must comply and demonstrate compliance with strict sustainability criteria. 
They set rigorous requirements on the minimum level of greenhouse gas emissions savings 
(provide at least 35% GHG emissions savings compared to fossil fuels, a threshold set to rise 
to 50% as of 2017, and to 60% as of 2018), appropriate land use (raw material must not be 
grown on land with high-carbon stocks) as well as monitoring requirements for any potential 
adverse effect. Moreover, the European Commission is duty-bound to report on food 
availability, compliance with land-use rights and with international labour conventions. The 
technical requirements for compliance amount to ‘methods of production’ and not to ‘like 
products’ (the fuels themselves), the basis for trade liberalisation in the WTO ever since 
GATT was started. They therefore qualify as technical barriers to trade, and for many WTO 
partners these are very sensitive, if not regarded as quasi-protectionism. The TTIP could 
address this.  
5.3 The EU’s fuel quality Directive 
A third area for potential barriers to be removed relates to the text of the EU’s fuel quality 
Directive of 2009. In particular, the fuel quality Directive ranks transport fuels by carbon 
intensity and is intended to put the more carbon intensive at a disadvantage, hence 
promoting the ‘cleaner’ ones, in particular by discriminating between the qualities of the 
source crudes. This implies that fuels produced from Canadian tar sands or US 
unconventional oil would face entry barriers into the EU’s transport fuel market. In practice, 
however, the text has never been translated into enforceable standards. Furthermore, not 
having been included in the EU discussions on the renewal of the climate targets to 2030, the 
scope of the fuel quality Directive expires in 2020, while it is not clear what regime will be in 
place from 2020 onwards. 
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A similar argument exists in relation to biofuels trade, but in this case the US and the EU are 
playing on the same side, using technical standards to discriminate against imports, mainly 
from Latin America, and thereby indirectly supporting domestic production. However, such 
technical barriers also limit the possibility of trading between each other, and in particular 
hamper the potential for US ethanol and biodiesel exports to the EU. Even inside the EU, 
however, the camps are divided between those who would prefer the fuel quality Directive 
to effectively become a barrier, hence promoting domestic production of biofuels (a segment 
which has a lot in common with agriculture, traditionally a protectionist stronghold) as 
opposed to their penetration into the fuel mix if there is a positive environmental effect. The 
TTIP could start that debate. 
6. Conclusions 
There are potential gains in facilitating trade in energy products across the Atlantic, possibly 
to an even larger extent than there is in sectors currently included in the scope of the TTIP. 
The benefits can be divided into direct gains and policy gains, and the action required to 
unlock these benefits relates to NTBs, in line with the nature and hard core of the TTIP itself. 
It is fair to say that LNG exports to Europe will depend on regional pricing, which however 
is in flux right now. Europe would have to want LNG for this pattern to be put in place. 
Quite the opposite could be said of crude oil flows, as US grades would likely flow to Europe 
in the event the 1975 export ban were lifted,17 thus improving EU refining margins and 
perhaps reducing the new westbound gasoline trend, possibly to the point of restoring the 
traditional pattern of European exports to the US. New players entering the distressed EU 
refining industry with different goals than the vertically integrated incumbents might also 
change the picture in favour of a resurrection of European refining and possibly, in the end, 
even eroding the US advantage in the diesel segment, and the corresponding trade flows. 
A gradual convergence in regulatory norms and practice would accelerate this trend. For 
example, successful conclusion of the debate over the fuel quality Directive, with the 
adoption of European limitations, would also impact this trend. The failure of this piece of 
legislation, or the more unlikely adoption of something similar in North America, could 
maintain the status quo. That aside, the fuel quality Directive could represent a piece of a 
broader process of regulatory harmonisation that has the potential to create mutual 
advantages; the introduction of a common framework for the limitation of pollutants, 
including greenhouse gases, could be another one, even if prospects seems remote. The fuel 
quality Directive is also a double-edged sword in that it works as a protectionist measure 
against EU imports of biofuels from the US. It seems fair to suggest that the effectiveness of 
this Directive is sacrificed as a bargaining chip for the EU, in order to achieve the inclusion of 
energy in the TTIP in the form of an opening for export of oil and gas from the US. 
Most of these policy improvements are more grounded in politics than they are in trade: 
improving transatlantic security and tackling environmental issues together, if not sharing 
the burden on the competitiveness of the energy sector at large, would be an undisputable 
improvement. Granted, the US cannot be asked to give up its competitive advantage for the 
                                                   
17 To a small extent, they already are: since 2014, some US Gulf Coast producers have been able to sell Eagle Ford 
light crude for export to European buyers, bypassing it through a splitter and self-classifying it as a product, thus 
circumventing the ban. 
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sake of transatlantic cooperation. But the US should not fear removing NTBs in the refining 
and biofuels sectors, although losers would need to be addressed. On a systemic level, trade 
in a commodity benefits the factor that is specific to the export sector; it triggers a shift of all 
other factors towards production that is intensive in that factor; and therefore, it ultimately 
works to the benefit of the economy which is most abundant in that factor. The US, now rich 
in hydrocarbons, has no reason to fear for its competitiveness in a free trade Atlantic 
community. 
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• Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
• An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 
